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Abstract
In a series of related experiments, we ask peo-
ple to choose whether to split their attention be-
tween two equally likely potential tasks, or priori-
tise one task at the expense of the other. When the
tasks are easy, the best strategy is to prepare for
both of them. As di culty increases beyond the
point where participants can perform both tasks
accurately, they should switch strategy and focus
on one task at the expense of the other. Across
three di↵erent modalities (target detection, throw-
ing, and memory), none of the participants switch
strategy at the correct point. Moreover, the ma-
jority consistently fail to modify their behaviour
with task di culty at all. This failure may be re-
lated to uncertainty about the trial outcome, be-
cause in a version of the experiment in which there
is no uncertainty, participants were uniformly op-
timal. Keywords: decision making, optimal be-
haviour
1 Introduction
A goalie can choose to stand in the middle of the
net or to stand to one side or the other. A student
can choose to study all the course material, or to
focus on learning a subset more deeply. A funding
body can choose to divide resources across a large
number of projects, or to focus resources on one or
two especially promising ones. At its simplest, the
choice that will lead to the best outcome in each of
these scenarios depends on the likelihood of suc-
cess given constraints of time and ability: Is it
possible to achieve multiple goals given these con-
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straints? If so, it makes sense to try and achieve
them all. Otherwise, we are better o↵ focusing our
resources on only one task or goal at the expense of
the others. Here we report results from three ex-
periments that – despite using very di↵erent meth-
ods – all converge on the conclusion that humans
are surprisingly deficient at achieving optimal out-
comes. When presented with a choice between di-
viding available resources between two goals ver-
sus investing all their resources in one goal, the
participants were poor at choosing the best strat-
egy even though the factors they need to take into
account are relatively stable and limited. A def-
inition of optimal decisions is those that achieve
the best possible outcome while minimising en-
ergy expenditure and risk. There are many exam-
ples of optimal or near-optimal decisions in hu-
mans (e.g. Kibbe and Kowler, 2011, Ko¨rding and
Wolpert, 2004, Najemnik and Geisler, 2005, Oruc¸,
Maloney, and Landy, 2003). Wolpert and Landy
(2012), for example, have argued that motor con-
trol can be viewed as a decision-making problem
of maximising movement outcome dependent on
task, motor and sensory uncertainty. However,
others have demonstrated human failures to max-
imise expected gain in more deliberative human
decisions Gardner (1959), Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1984), Morvan and Maloney (2012), Vulkan
(2000), Zhang, Morvan, Etezad-Heydari, and Mal-
oney (2012).
Our interest in optimal decision-making be-
gan with an intriguing contradiction in the visual
search literature. One influential model of search
(Najemnik and Geisler, 2005) proposes that each
eye movement during search is directed to the lo-
cation that decreases uncertainty about the target
location by the maximum amount possible. How-
1
Clarke & Hunt (2015)
ever, Morvan and Maloney (2012) recently pro-
vided striking evidence that human observers do
not reliably fixate locations that maximise their
probability of detecting a target. In their study,
observers had to choose where to fixate, and then
a low-contrast discrimination target would appear
inside one of two boxes. If humans take the prob-
ability of detecting the target at a given eccentric-
ity into account when deciding where to fixate,
they should fixate a location in between the two
boxes when they are relatively close together. As
the boxes move further apart, they will reach an
eccentricity at which it is no longer possible to dis-
criminate the target in either box above chance.
At this point, observers should switch to a strat-
egy of fixating one or the other box, since this will
yield accuracy close to 100% if the target happens
to appear inside the fixated box, and an at-chance
accuracy if it does not. Surprisingly, not only did
all four of the observers fail to maximise their tar-
get discrimination performance, their tendency to
fixate between versus on the target boxes did not
vary with the distance between the boxes at all.
Morvan and Maloney (2012) propose that saccade
target selection is based largely on heuristics, such
as a tendency to saccade in particular directions,
rather than taking visual sensitivity and uncer-
tainty into account.
The failure to adjust fixation strategy in re-
sponse to this very simple change in spatial con-
figuration is surprising, and di cult to reconcile
with models of fixation behaviour that depend
on a mechanism that maximises information gain
(Hayhoe and Ballard, 2014, Najemnik and Geisler,
2005). Our first experiment therefore replicated
Morvan and Maloney (2012) in a larger sample.
We then were interested in establishing whether
this failure of optimal behaviour could be consid-
ered specific to the context of eye movements and
detection of targets, or a larger problem pervading
human decisions in general. Saccadic eye move-
ments are rapid, energy-e cient, and frequently
not under voluntary control, so the decisional pro-
cesses involved may not generalize to other modal-
ities. Indeed, there is precedent for rapid motor
responses to achieve di↵erent outcomes than de-
liberative decisions (Hunt and Klein, 2002, Wu,
Delgado, and Maloney, 2009). The aim of our
study is investigate whether participants exhibit
more strategic decision-making in tasks involving
deliberate, high-stakes decisions that have more
tangible outcomes.
We carried out a series of four related experi-
ments. While each experiment varied in terms of
task and modality (detection, throwing, memory
and reaching), crucially they all involved the same
decision-making paradigm: to experimentally cre-
ate a point at which, to achieve the best possible
outcome, it is necessary to switch between divid-
ing available resources across two goals versus in-
vesting all resources in one goal. All experiments
were conducted in two sessions. In the first session
participants performed the task with only one tar-
get/goal. The purpose of this session was to both
characterise each participant’s performance across
di culty, as well as to facilitate the participant’s
awareness of their own level of skill across di -
culty. In the second session, participants repeated
the task, but this time there were two potential
targets, and the participant had to make a de-
cision about whether to divide possible success
evenly between the two targets, or to abandon
one target in favour of the other. Each partici-
pants’ choices can be compared to individualized
estimates of what they should have chosen.
2 Method
The motivation and logic of the four experiments
were similar, so we report the methods and results
for all four together.
2.1 Participants
Forty-eight undergraduates at the University of
Aberdeen were recruited to participate, twelve for
each experiment. All participants were recruited
via word of mouth and were naive to the aims of
the experiment. All gave informed consent to par-
ticipate in the experiments, which were reviewed
and approved by the School of Psychology ethics
committee.
2.2 Materials and Procedures
Stimuli and setup: Stimuli and layout for each
of the four experiments are shown in Figure 1.
Specific details for each of the four experiments
are described below.
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Figure 1: Example stimuli and set-up of the second session of each experiment. A The detection experiment:
participants start the trial by fixating the cross. After they shift their gaze to one of the three boxes, the target
(a small white circle) appears inside the left or right box. Eccentricity of the boxes varied. B The throwing
experiment: participants were told what color their target hoop will be. They choose a place to stand and
are then told which of the two hoops of that color is their target. C The memory experiment: Example of a
trial with 5-digit numbers. Participants do not know which number they will have to report. D The reaching
experiment: Participants are told which color beanbag they will need to pick up, and asked to select a chair.
2.2.1 Detection Experiment
Morvan and Maloney (2012) found choice behav-
ior that was idiosyncratic but clearly not optimal
in the four observers they tested. We expected to
replicate this pattern, but wanted to ensure it held
true in a larger sample. Given that each observer
is compared against an individualized estimate of
their own optimal strategy, however, a very large
sample is unnecessary, so we decided on a sample
size of 12 for this and all subsequent experiments.
An Eyelink 1000 (SR Research, Canada) was used
to record eye movements. The aim of the Session
1 of the experiment was to obtain a psychometric
function for each participant for target detection,
and for the participant to gain practice with the
detection task and familiarity with their own
level of performance. The stimulus consisted
of two grey squares (length = 1.8 , measured
in degrees of visual angle), equidistant (  2
{2.9 , 5.7 , 7.1 , 8.3 , 9.4 , 10.5 , 11.7 , 12.8 })
from a central fixation cross. After the partic-
ipant had maintained a stable central fixation
for 1 second, the target (a small white circle)
was presented at the top or bottom of one of
the two squares. The stimulus was displayed
for 500ms, after which a blank grey screen was
displayed. The trial was immediately cancelled
if the participant broke central fixation. Partici-
pants responded via keypress (up/down arrows)
as to whether the target had been presented at
the top or bottom of one of the two squares, with
the instruction to just guess if they were not sure.
There were four blocks of 96 trials (384 trials in
total). Within each block, trials were presented
in order of increasing  . No feedback was given.
Individual performance was modelled in R using
a generalised linear model with the mafc-probit
link function from the psyphy package. Let  ( )
be this function, where   is the distance from the
fixation point to the target.
In the second session, which took place about a
week later, participants fixated a crosshair above
three boxes and were instructed to choose one box
to fixate. The crosshair was presented above the
targets and positioned so that it was equidistant
from the central and rightmost grey square (see
Figure 1A for an illustration of the trial setup).
This meant that the cross’s position varied with
the separation. The same eight values of   as
above were used, with 48 repetitions of each. This
gave a total of 384 trials, which were presented in a
random order. After a fixation was detected inside
one of the three boxes, the target was presented in
either the left or right box and, as in Part 1, the
participant had to simply report whether the tar-
get had appeared up or down. Participants were
told the target would never appear in the center
box. We use   from Session 1 to derive each partic-
ipant’s optimal strategy and predicted accuracy.
When the separation between the boxes is small,
participants can direct their saccade towards the
central box and have a good chance of detecting
the target in either location. Once   increases to
the point where  ( ) < 0.75 the participant should
switch strategies and fixate either the left or right
box. When fixating the left or right box, there is a
50% chance that the target will appear at fixation,
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giving them ⇡ 100% chance of correctly respond-
ing up or down, and a 50% chance that the target
will appear at the other box, in which case they
will be correct 50% of the time by guessing. To-
gether this gives an expected accuracy of 75%.
2.2.2 Throwing Experiment
This experiment is analogous to the detection ex-
periment, except the task is to get a beanbag into
one of two hoops. It is not known which hoop
will be designated as the target, and participants
are asked to choose a standing position. For two
hoops close to one another, the ideal position to
stand is halfway between them. If the distance be-
tween hoops is too large to throw accurately from
the center, however, the optimal behaviour is to
stand close to one hoop, giving a success rate of
50%.
The experiment took place in a sheltered area
of concrete slabs (see Figure 1B). Each slab was
0.46⇥0.61m, making them useful markers for plac-
ing hoops and recording standing positions. In
the first session, participants stood in the center
slab of the area, which was marked with black
tape, and flat hoops with a diameter of 0.40m were
placed at six di↵erent distances from them (1.88,
3.22, 4.14, 5.06, 6.90, and 8.74m). Each partici-
pant tossed 12 beanbags for each hoop distance,
in order of increasing distance, with each bean-
bag cleared from the area after each toss. The
participant then completed the same set of dis-
tances but tossing in the opposite direction (this
was counterbalanced), for a total of 144 trials. A
trial was recorded as ”correct” if the final rest-
ing place of the beanbag was inside or touching
the specified hoop. No di↵erences between direc-
tion were found so we ignored this factor in subse-
quent analyses. Each participant’s accuracy was
modelled using logistic regression with a fixed in-
tercept of (0, 0.99). That is, we assume that par-
ticipants are 99% accurate if they stand right next
to the hoop. Each participant’s curve (modelled
the same way as the detection experiment) was
used to select six slabs on which to place hoops
in Session 2. We based these around the slab at
which participants were closest to 50% accurate
(i.e. where  ( ) = 0.50, which we will call slab
M . This is the point where, to maximise accu-
racy, participants should switch between standing
in the centre to standing close to one or the other
hoop.
For the first block of Session 2, six hoops were
taped down, three in each direction: at slabsM+1
M   1 and on the slab with expected accuracy of
90% (relative to a centre point, which was un-
marked). The second block was the same config-
uration but with hoops taped down on slabs M ,
M +2, and on the slab with expected accuracy of
10%. Red hoops were always closest, yellow in the
middle, and blue furthest away. Participants were
told:
“You will be given a beanbag. Your
task is to get the beanbag into one of the
two hoops of the same color. For exam-
ple, if you are handed a yellow beanbag,
this means you will have to get the bean-
bag into one of the two yellow hoops. I
am not going to tell you which hoop yet.
First, you need to select a place to stand.
You can choose anywhere you like within
the paved area, but remember your task
is to get the beanbag in the hoop of the
specified color. Once you are in position,
tell the experimenter you are ready.”
Participants received one practice trial, and then
completed 48 decisions/throws in each block (16
trials for each distance condition in a random or-
der). The main experimenter stood on the grass
to the side of the paved area and the participant
returned to them after each trial to receive a new
beanbag, while the other experimenter cleared the
beanbags and recorded accuracy and standing po-
sition (the numbers 1 to 40 had been chalked on
the edge of the paved area from one end to the
other, for quick and subtle recording of standing
position). The order of colour and direction of
throw was randomised separately for each partic-
ipant.
2.2.3 Memory Experiment
In this experiment participants were shown two
numbers, and later asked to report only one of
them. At the time of presentation, the partici-
pant did not know which number would have to
be reported. If the two numbers have a small num-
ber of digits, and are therefore easy to remember,
the ideal behaviour is to look at, and memorise,
both numbers. However, as the number of dig-
its increases to the limits of your digit span, the
optimal behaviour is to focus on just one of the
numbers and ignore the other one.
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In Session 1 we measured each participant’s
digit span. Stimuli consisted of a randomly-
generated sequence of between 2 and 12 digits.
On each trial this digit sequence was displayed on
the left or the right hand side of the screen. The
two halves of the screen had a di↵erent coloured
background, with the colours swapping randomly
on a trial to trial basis. The number was dis-
played for five seconds, after which it was re-
placed with a grey screen for three seconds. Fi-
nally, a response screen was presented, consisting
of the same coloured background as earlier, with
the prompt ”please enter the number” displayed
at the location where the sequence of digits had
originally been placed. Participants then typed
the number in using the keypad. A response was
considered correct if all the digits were typed in
the correct order. There were nine repetitions at
each number length, giving 99 trials in total. Tri-
als were presented in a random order and partic-
ipants were given a break halfway through. As
with the earlier experiments, we model each par-
ticipant’s accuracy using logistic regression, giving
 (n) as the probability of remembering an n-digit
number.
The second session of the experiment was sim-
ilar to the first. The main di↵erences were that
participants were eye-tracked while carrying out
the task (with an Eyelink 1000 as in Experiment
1 above), and they were presented with two se-
quences of digits to memorize (Figure 1C). The
two sequences of digits were equal in length. When
the response screen was shown, participants were
prompted to report either the left or the right
number. The coloured background was used as
an additional prompt. There were 165 trials: 15
repetitions for each value of n (2 to 12, as in Ses-
sion 1). Trials were presented in random order.
Eye-tracking data were analysed by assigning
fixations to one of two 14  ⇥ 2.8  areas of inter-
est centred on the two numbers. Fixations falling
outside of these areas were discarded. Attentional
split was then defined as the proportion of time
spent fixating the area of interest that received
the most attention. So a value of 0.5 indicates
the participant spent equal time looking at both
numbers, while a value of 1.0 tells us that par-
ticipants spent all their time fixating one of the
numbers. Unlike the previous two experiments, it
is not as straightforward to derive the predicted
accuracy given an optimal strategy. We can esti-
mate the probability of remembering both num-
bers as  (2n), but the data show that this un-
derestimates performance for small n (see sup-
plementary materials), presumably due to chunk-
ing (Miller, 1956). We assume that for small n,
our participants were memorising both numbers.
However, as n increases the task becomes increas-
ingly di cult, participants should change strategy
and only attempt to remember one number, with a
probability of them getting the trial correct being
0.5 (n).
2.2.4 Reaching Experiment
To foreshadow, the results of the above three ex-
periments indicated consistent failures in strategic
thinking. In the final experiment we took the ba-
sic choice we asked of participants in the previous
experiments to a trivially simple level, to ensure
our results are not a consequence of participants
failing to fully understand the decision we were
asking them to make. Six beanbags were placed
on a long table (Figure 1D), with two red beanbags
near the centre, two green beanbags each placed
halfway to the end, and a blue beanbag at each
end. Participants were first asked to sit in a chair
placed by the middle of the table and asked to
try and reach, with their back still touching the
seat, the red, green, and blue beanbags (demon-
strating their own reach span, as in Session 1 of
the previous experiments). Participants were then
asked to stand, and the experimenter asked them
to choose one of three chairs to sit in to pick up
a beanbag of a specified color. As in the throwing
experiment, they were not told which of the two
beanbags of this color they would have to pick up
until after they selected a chair. Participants se-
lected a chair once for each of the three colours.
The order of colors and which was to be picked up
was randomised for each participant.
3 Results
A typical individual’s data from Session 1 of each
of the saccade, throwing, and memory experi-
ments are shown in the top row of Figure 2. The
full set of data from all participants can be found
in the supplementary information. In the bottom
row of Figure 2, the same participant’s actual be-
haviour in the second session is compared to the
optimal strategy derived from their Session 1 per-
formance (the blue line).
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Figure 2: Results from one participant in each of the detection, throwing and memory experiments. Results
from other participants were similar and are shown in the supplementary materials. Top row shows Session 1
accuracy. Accuracy decreased as the task di culty increased, either by increasing distance ( ) or, in the case
of the memory task, the number of digits. Error bars show 95% binomial proportion confidence intervals. As
the detection task is two-alternative forced choice, chance performance is 50%. The bottom row shows decision
behaviour from the same participants in Session 2 of the experiments. For the detection task, the participant’s
choice is binary and hence each dot represents the proportion of trials on which the participant fixated the side
box in each condition. In the other two tasks, each dot represents behaviour on a single trial. For the throwing
experiment, position “0” is the center and “1” is the distance to the target color on that trial. The blue line
illustrates the optimal strategy that the participant should adopt, based on their performance in Part 1.
Figure 3 shows the decision behaviour of all
individuals in all four experiments. In the first
three experiments, the overwhelming majority of
participants failed to systematically change their
behaviour with increasing task di culty. In the
detection experiment, as in Morvan and Maloney
(2012), each participant selects their own individ-
ual strategy, and they tend not to vary this strat-
egy as di culty increases. Only one of the 12 par-
ticipants exhibited behaviour that approached an
optimal strategy1. For the throwing experiment,
there are fewer trials and individual strategies are
less consistent; nonetheless the participants stood,
in aggregate, just as close to the centre when
throwing to hoops that were far away as when the
hoops were close together. For this experiment we
also examined sequence e↵ects at the trial level to
see if participants had a tendency to learn or to
1See Supplementary material, Figure SupMat.1, Partic-
ipant 3. This participant was the only member of our lab
to participate in any of the studies, although she was naive
to the aims of the experiment.
persist over time with one strategy over another.
There was no consistent pattern here (see Sup-
plementary Information, Figure SupMat.4). For
the memory experiment, they were as likely to
fixate both digit sequences when they were long
as when they were short, although several par-
ticipants came closer to adopting a strategy that
was optimal in this experiment, a detail we will
return to in the discussion. In the reaching task,
designed to check that participants could correctly
understand the instructions used in the preceding
studies, participants were uniformly optimal.
Each participant’s choice behaviour can be
modelled by fitting a step function [y = c1 for all
x <= s, y = c2 for all x > s, where s is the point at
which the participant switch strategies (e.g. from
a centre to a side strategy). A linear model would
not be appropriate, given the nature of the opti-
mal strategy as depicted in Figure 2. We fit s,
c1, and c2 to the data using least-squares. From
this model fit, four patterns of behaviour can be
roughly categorized:
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Figure 3: First Row: Choice behaviour for the four experiments. In the first three panels, each coloured
line shows a di↵erent participant, while in the fourth panel, all twelve participants behaved in the same way,
as illustrated by the black line. In each experiment, as task di culty increases (moving along the x-axis),
and optimal participant would exhibit a step function similar to that seen in the bottom row of Figure 2,
from maximising their performance on both targets, to maximising their performance for one of the two targets.
Participants generally failed to adopt this behaviour, except in the reaching task, where all participants behaved
optimally. Second row: Results of analysis described in text in which step functions were fitted to the individual
data shown above. The x-axis shows the position of the step relative to the optimal location, and the y-axis
shows the size of the step. Optimal behaviour in each dimension is represented by the two black lines on each
plot. Filled dots: participants’ model fit R2 > .1; Open dots: R2 < .1.
A Perfectly rational behaviour would lead to c1 =
0, c2 = 1 [c1 = 0.5 in the memory study], with s
equal to the point predicted by the performance
of each individual.
B A participant may behave rationally, but with
a biased or noisy estimate of their own ability.
This would lead to c1 ⇡ 0 and c2 ⇡ 1, but
with a value of s that does not match the opti-
mal switch point and/or unexplained variance
(a low R2).
C If participants fail to behave rationally, but still
modify strategy with task di culty, c2 should
be larger than c1, but fall short of the maximum
step size. For example, in the detection study,
a step with c1 = 0 and a c2 = 0.5 (leading to
a step size of 0.5) would mean the participant
always fixated the central box when the boxes
were close together, and fixated the side box on
half the trials with a large separation.
D Participants may not modify behaviour at all
or do so in the wrong direction, leading to no
step or a reversed step (further indicated by an
R2 close to 0).
All the model fits from this analysis are given
in Table 1 of the supplementary information, and
summarized in Figure 3 (second row). We focus
in this figure on the size of the step, which should
be 1 (0.5 in memory study) and the position of
the step relative to its predicted location under
an optimal strategy. As can be seen in this fig-
ure, all participants in the reaching experiment
are perfectly described by the step function (Cat-
egory A of the scheme laid out above). Of the
three other studies, no participants could be de-
scribed as being in Categories A and B. Only in
the memory experiment was the step function a
reasonable model for participant behaviour (9 par-
ticipants had an R2 > .1 as indicated by the filled
circles, falling into Category C). In the other two
studies, step size, direction, and location were gen-
erally not consistent with a choice behaviour that
was modified by task di culty (Category D), with
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the possible exception of a few participants.
In Figure 4 we compare overall accuracy in Ses-
sion 2 (observed) to accuracy expected if an opti-
mal strategy, as well a simple reference strategy,
had been adopted by each participant. Accuracy
of the optimal strategy was calculated for each
distance (or number of digits) as described in the
methods section above. This value was calculated
individually for each participant based on their
psychometric curve. Expected optimal accuracy
as shown in Figure 4 represents the mean over all
distances/di culties. For saccades, throwing, and
reaching, we used expected performance from the
central location as a reference (“central”), and in
the memory task the reference is expected per-
formance from only looking at one number (“sin-
gle”). We can see that for the saccade, throwing
and memory tasks participants manage to out-
perform the reference, but the majority of them
fail to achieve optimal performance. This dif-
ference is significant when evaluated in a paired
t-test comparing “observed” accuracy to “opti-
mal” (detection task: t(11) =  2.45, p = 0.017;
throwing task: t(11) =  3.65, p = 0.002; mem-
ory task: t(11) =  3.98, p = 0.001). It should
be noted that this way of illustrating the mag-
nitude of the observed-optimal di↵erences down-
plays our e↵ect compared to if we had excluded
conditions in which the reference and optimal be-
haviours are identical (such as very short distances
in the throwing task where the optimal behaviour
is to stand halfway between the targets).
For one participant in the detection task, there
was no di↵erence in their central and optimal
strategy; this occurred because their visual acuity
was good enough to perform above chance even
at the largest eccentricity. Similarly, across de-
tection, throwing, and memory tasks, several par-
ticipants achieved accuracy in Session 2 that was
higher than our predictions based on their Session
1 performance, likely due to practice e↵ects. This
suggests our estimate of optimal accuracy is con-
servative.
4 Discussion
We observed a striking failure to make optimal de-
cisions in three of the four tasks presented above.
In the fourth, where the task was to choose a seat
from which to reach one of two beanbags, people
were all able to select a chair close to one or the
other beanbag when the two beanbags were too
far away to reach from the central chair. This re-
sult demonstrates that our participants are able to
understand the instructions and the constraints on
their decision well enough to behave sensibly when
the task is trivial. Why are they seemingly unable
to make this decision in the other situations? The
possible explanations fall into three general cate-
gories.
First, participants may fail to estimate their
own performance accurately. A di↵erence between
the reaching task and the others is that in the
former, the choice depends on the length of one’s
arm, while the others involve learning and remem-
bering the limitations of one’s own visual acu-
ity, throwing skill, and memory - arguably more
abstract and di cult to estimate. An inability
to estimate performance seems unlikely, however,
given the extensive practice participants had in
the first session with the range of distance and dif-
ficulty levels presented in the second. Performance
changes across these manipulations were stable
and systematic (this is clear from the individual
curves presented in the supplementary informa-
tion), and people have been previously shown to
be able to accurately estimate and make decisions
based on expected performance (e.g. Barthelme´
and Mamassian, 2009, Paunonen and Hong, 2010).
Moreover, if people were estimating performance
incorrectly or imprecisely, we would expect there
to be a switch in strategies with increasing task
di culty at some point, but participants would
not switch consistently or at the optimal level of
di culty (i.e. we would expect to see some evi-
dence of bounded rationality, Simon, 1991). This
describes what we denoted as Category B be-
haviour in the results of the model fit. No partic-
ipants were well described by this category, sug-
gesting a more global failure.
Second, participants may fail to frame the deci-
sion correctly. Achieving optimality requires the
participants to make a logical decision (whether
to invest in one option or both), followed some-
times by an entirely arbitrary decision (which tar-
get/option to invest in). Participants are able to
make this pair of decisions e↵ectively in the reach-
ing task, demonstrating that they are capable of
understanding the decision and its outcome in this
very simple context. Perhaps the additional per-
formance demands in the detection, throwing, and
memory tasks distract participants from framing
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Figure 4: Accuracy of each participant in each experiment (“observed”) relative to how accurate we
would expect each observer to be given a simple reference strategy and an optimal strategy. Note:
these figures take the average performance over a range of stimuli, including cases in which there is
no di↵erence in central/single and optimal performance. Hence these figures under-estimate the size
of the e↵ect. In the reaching task, the observed accuracy is higher than optimal because eight out of
twelve participants happened to choose the seat in front of the randomly-selected reach target (within
the variation we would expect based on chance)
the task appropriately, or trial-to-trial changes in
task di culty prevent participants from setting a
single threshold at which to switch between strate-
gies. During debriefing, we asked participants in
the throwing experiment to tell us how they ar-
rived at their decisions, and some were arbitrary,
while others became focused on finding some pat-
tern in the order of targets selected (even though
they were told this was random). More partic-
ipants fell into Category C in the memory task
than in the detection and throwing tasks (i.e. they
modified their behaviour with di culty). Unlike
in the other experiments, in which decisions were
discrete, behaviour in the memory task unfolds
over a 5-second interval, so the participants may
have been able to learn from the cumulative e↵ect
of their choice behaviour more e↵ectively.
A third possible explanation is that participants
are prioritising something other than accuracy in
the task. Most (but not all) participants were bi-
ased towards investing in both potential targets
rather than focusing on one. Performing the task
in more di cult circumstances may be seen as a
challenge or an opportunity for learning, while se-
lecting one or the other option takes away the chal-
lenge and puts the outcome in the hands of chance,
which may be seen as a failure to be responsible
for the outcome. Relatedly, it may be a partic-
ularly unpleasant experience to guess incorrectly
and have the non-selected option turn out to be
the target, and participants who happen to experi-
ence this loss on a series of trials in a row may have
been discouraged from investing in a single option
on subsequent trials. It should be noted that in
the detection experiment of Morvan and Maloney
(2012) participants were given substantial mone-
tary rewards for accuracy, which does not seem to
have made them any more likely to adopt an op-
timal strategy. Nonetheless, our participants were
not explicitly rewarded for accuracy, so we cannot
rule out that some of them may have decided to
prioritise their own interest/pleasure in the task
over accuracy.
There are many ways to be sub-optimal, and
the fact that no single explanation from those
listed above can account for all the results sug-
gests that they all play a possible role to some
extent and in some individuals. Nonetheless, only
in the reaching experiment do participants demon-
strate behaviour that could be classified as opti-
mal. It is easy to imagine many scenarios in which
the decision to invest all one’s resources in one
goal versus to divide resources between two goals
would have serious consequences for an organ-
ism’s survival (e.g. o↵spring investment; forag-
ing). Given this, why is our ability to make a logi-
cal choice under these circumstances so easily dis-
rupted? As situations become more complex, with
increasing numbers of tasks and goals and decreas-
ingly reliable ways of estimating likely success, the
computations involved in determining the opti-
mal strategy become more resource-intensive and
time-consuming, and the potential pay-o↵ dimin-
ishes (e.g. DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal, 2009).
It is our suggestion that, as a consequence of the
complexity involved in deciding between multiple
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goals in most situations, people in general fail to
employ a sensible strategy even when the required
computations are extremely simple. This leads to
the paradoxical conclusion that people’s choices
about how to allocate resources across multiple
tasks are probably not optimal in principle, but
they are usually adequate for complex situations.
It is only as the tasks become fewer and the situ-
ation simpler that the failure to adopt a sensible
strategy becomes both more apparent, and also
more detrimental.
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Figure SupMat.1: The complete results from the 12 participants in the detection experiment. Top set: results
from Session 1. The black line is the psychometric curve fit to their data. Middle set: Proportion of saccades
to the side square in Session 2 (black dots) compared to an estimate of optimal fixation behaviour based on
Session 1 performance (blue line). Bottom set: Detection accuracy (black dots) compared to predicted accuracy
under a baseline (blue line) and optimal (red line) strategy
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Figure SupMat.2: The complete results from the 12 participants in the throwing experiment. Top set: results
from Session 1. The black line is the psychometric curve fit to their data. Middle set: standing position at each
of six distances in Session 2 (black dots) compared to an estimate of optimal standing position based on Session
1 performance (blue line). Y-axis range has been restricted to 0-1, which removed data points for participants
7, 8, and 9, who sometimes stood outside the range of the hoops. Bottom set: Throwing accuracy (black dots)
compared to predicted accuracy under an optimal (red line) strategy.
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Figure SupMat.3: The complete results from the 12 participants in the memory experiment. Top set: results
from Session 1. The black line is the psychometric curve fit to their data, giving  (n) as the probability of
remembering an n-digit number. Middle set: Attentional split (relative proportion of time spent on one digit,
black dots) in Session 2. Bottom set: Memory accuracy in Session 2 (black dots) compared to predicted accuracy
under an optimal strategy, calculated as the maximum of the red ( (n)) and orange (0.5 (n)) lines
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Figure SupMat.4: This figure shows trial-to-trial sequential variation in participant standing position (the
red line) in the throwing experiment. The first column shows the first block, the second column shows the
second block. Each row corresponds to an individual participant. The black bars indicate the trials in which
the optimal strategy is to stand by the hoop, otherwise they should stand at the mid-point. Discontinuities in
the red line correspond to trials in which the participant stood further than 1.5 normalized distance units from
the center (Y axis range has been restricted to 1.5 to improve visibility).
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Experiment Participant s sopt c1 c2 c2   c1 R2
detection 1 4.3 8.7 0.32 0.84 0.52 0.11
detection 2 11.1 5.6 0.15 0.06 -0.09 0.02
detection 3 8.8 10.7 0.31 0.86 0.56 0.32
detection 4 4.3 6.1 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04
detection 5 4.3 7.7 0.96 0.82 -0.14 0.03
detection 6 12.3 10.4 0.59 0.41 -0.18 0.02
detection 7 6.4 7.8 0.51 0.84 0.33 0.08
detection 8 4.3 6.8 0.35 0.69 0.34 0.05
detection 9 4.3 6.5 0.81 0.53 -0.28 0.03
detection 10 4.3 6.9 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.07
detection 11 4.3 - 0.48 0.56 0.08 < 0.01
detection 12 7.7 9.6 0.99 0.98 -0.02 < 0.01
throwing 1 3.0 3.9 0.29 0.21 -0.08 0.03
throwing 2 3.9 4.4 0.39 0.29 -0.09 0.05
throwing 3 3.0 3.9 0.36 0.26 -0.11 0.05
throwing 4 6.7 4.8 0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.05
throwing 5 3.5 3.9 0.02 0.25 0.23 0.55
throwing 6 4.8 3.2 0.08 0.48 0.40 0.25
throwing 7 2.5 4.4 1.09 0.43 -0.66 0.21
throwing 8 3.5 4.4 0.21 0.37 0.16 0.05
throwing 9 6.2 4.8 0.54 0.35 -0.20 0.03
throwing 10 5.1 4.4 0.00 0.18 0.18 0.70
throwing 11 5.5 4.4 0.12 0.50 0.38 0.41
throwing 12 3.0 4.4 0.19 0.11 -0.08 0.08
memory 1 7.5 3.5 0.68 0.82 0.13 0.23
memory 2 10.5 3.5 0.60 0.62 0.02 0.01
memory 3 5.5 4.5 0.62 0.80 0.17 0.32
memory 4 8.5 4.5 0.61 0.64 0.03 0.02
memory 5 4.5 3.5 0.60 0.72 0.12 0.14
memory 6 4.5 3.5 0.63 0.71 0.09 0.08
memory 7 5.5 4.5 0.69 0.81 0.12 0.15
memory 8 7.5 4.5 0.63 0.79 0.16 0.38
memory 9 6.5 3.5 0.65 0.74 0.09 0.11
memory 10 8.5 4.5 0.71 0.80 0.09 0.11
memory 11 5.5 3.5 0.61 0.71 0.10 0.18
memory 12 6.5 3.5 0.65 0.83 0.19 0.39
Table 1: s=location of the step; Sopt = predicted value for s based on participants performance curve;
c1 and c2 = value of the fitted model before and after the step. Minimum c1 in the memory study
is 0.5. Participant 11 in the detection experiment had unusually good peripheral vision, leading to
no point at which they should switch from looking in the center (hence no Sopt). In the reaching
experiment, for all participants, s = sopt, c1 = 0; c2 = 1 and R2 = 1.
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